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Introduction 
 
Achievement is  a multidimensional concept.  An individual may  remain poor but reach a 
respected position in the community he lives in, or he may earn a high income in an ill-famed  
profession, have a good school  or army record, or again he simply may succeed  in living up 
to his/her standards, whatever they are. In this paper we discuss a particularly important type 
of achievement,  namely school achievement , and  the relationship  between children's 
achievement and their parents' education level  As Haveman and Wolfe (1995) put  it: 
"(...) perhaps the most fundamental factor [among those  influencing child's educational 
attainment] is  the human capital of parents, typically measured by the number of school 
years attained. This variable (...) is included in virtually every study described [in their paper] 
(...);it is statistically significant and quantitatively important, no matter  how it is defined."  
In this paper we   do not challenge this  conclusion,  but try to look in more depth into it.  The 
question is, as the title of the paper says, why is parents' education so important in children 
performance.  We begin by concisely reviewing two issues related to the influence of the 
family on children performance, while the third one lies at the core of the  paper. 
The first issue is the well known  "nature or  nurture ?"  question. Parents pass on to their 
children their  genetic endowment. To the extent that school achievement depends on genetic 
factors, there might be no genuine causal relationship running from  parents' to children's 
school achievements, both being explained by the common genetic endowment. The idea 
that "genetics explains all", has far-reaching implications for the very conception of equality 
among human beings and for public policies pursuing such equality.This explains why this 
issue has been the subject of recurring harsh public debates (see for instance Jensen (1969), 
Kamin (1974),  Herrnstein-Murray (1994)) . The typical methods of behavioural  genetics (i.e. 
studies on twins and adoptees) have been used not only by genetists but also by scholars 
with a social and economic orientation (see  Bound-Solon (1999),  Holmlund, et al. (2008)  
and  Pronzato (2008)  for  comparison among methods). As a whole, it seems that although 
genetic factors are non-negligible, they account for a  partial share of the individual's 
performance (see for instance Thompson et al.(1991)  and DeFries  et al.  (2001)). 
Once the relative weights of  nature and nurture are established, much remains to be said 
about what  "nurture" is and  how it works. The next important question regards the relative 
weights of family- versus non-family influences. Even in disciplines usually  very keen on 
within-family effects, like developmental psychology, the issue of non-family effects emerges 
(see for instance the heathed debate stimulated in the psychologists' field by  Harris(1998)).  
On the other hand, even if one is willing to stress  the influences coming  from the social 
environment at large, neverthless one  would agree that such influences are possibly 
mediated by the family environment (see also Patacchini-Zenou (2004) for a  choice-based 
approach to the issue). Almost all recent studies based on the OECD -PISA  database (see in 
particular  Fertig-Schmidt (2002) , Fertig (2003), Bratti et. al. (2007), Sprietsma (2006), Fuchs 
and Woessman (2004) , Ammermullaer (2004)) include and  emphasize background variables 
like territorial factors  or  the immigrant  condition as  explanatory variables. In this paper  too  
a wide array  of these background  variables is taken into account. 
The third  important question is the nature of within-family influences. As economists, we are 
particularly interested in distinguishing between influences which require a specific allocation 
of resources and those which do not (see Becker and Tomes (1986)  for  an early 
contribution). Day-by-day interaction within the family influences per  se  the  performance of 
children :  just  think of how  transmission of ethical values, through moral suasion  or  
personal example may induce or not children to put effort into studying; of how critical events 
such as death or divorce or long-term factors like the number of siblings can affect  the school 
performance of children (Woessman (2003)). Notice also that, in these examples, the 
influence is in principle  independent  of  the parents' human capital  and, always in general,   
it may not require any specific allocation of time or  other resources to the task. In other cases 
it is still true that no time/resource allocation is needed for the influence to take place, but 
human capital may instead be required. This happens with within-family knowledge spillovers: 
the simplest example is how children may  learn a correct and sophisticated use of language 
by everyday exchanges with correctly speaking parents. 
There are, finally, forms of influence of parents on the school achievement of children which 
require time . These include on the one hand supervision activities, which per se are  
independent of parents' human capital (like for instance controlling that children do their 
homework or  regularly meeting teachers); on the other hand there  are assistance  activities 
which require both time and human capital (for instance, helping children when studying) . 
Which of the influences described is more or less relevant to child's school performance is an 
issue of some policy import. Were supervision time the sole factor influencing school 
performance, increasing the level of education of parents would be not beneficial (on this 
particular respect) , since it would increase the opportunity cost of time for parents and reduce 
their propensity to spend time in supervising children. If instead knowledge spillovers were the 
key factor, the conclusion would be the reverse one. Then understanding why is parents' 
education important may help in designing long-term education policies. There is a rather 
sensitive point to be made here. In this paragraph and in the model of the next one, we speak 
of "parent" and  "parents"  without any specification of  gender; all we say applies in principle 
to mothers and fathers alike. The economics of education literature is however rather keen on 
this kind of distinction . (some recent contributions are  Holmlund et al. (2008), Pronzato 
(2008), Behrman et al. (1997), Andrabi et al. (2009)). There are good reasons for this interest. 
The main one is that any notion of development meaning more than GDP growth, includes 
improving women education levels as a critical goal; then the effects of women education vìs-
a-vìs male education become  crucial. The other one is that that women and men play 
different roles within family.The nature and the strength of social and cultural background 
determines what such roles are and how  strict or interchangeable thay are; to the extent that 
different roles are systematically played, the same education level in mother and father might 
have differential impact on the children performance. As we shall see later, our  data seem to 
confirm that the impact of mother's education is more complex than that of father's. However 
we do not offer explanations of this difference. We simply take it as given and discuss at 
some length the evdience concerning mother's education. 
In this paper we model the parents' choice about the allocation of time between labour and 
children "guidance", which includes both supervision (guidance time whose effectiveness is 
independent of parents' education ) and assistance (guidance time whose effectiveness might 
in principle be sensitive to parents' education). Parents are characterized by a level of 
education and by an occupational status, which are observable, and by an underlying 
unobserved characteristic (parents' quality) which is related to education and to the 
occupational status in a non-deterministic way. (Section 2). The model  provides an 
interpretative framework for some of the results we obtain in Section 3. Section 4 concludes 
the paper. 
 
 
A model of parental support 
Let us  consider  the household (the  parent-child  pair) as an individual agent   whose utility  
depends on  s     (the school achievement of the child,as measured by the test score), and on 
consumption  c  .  Suppose that the household then  maximizes the following utility function 
 
 
max uc, s  c1−1 −   s
c  
           (1) 
 
 
 
 
This  functional form allows for a decreasing marginal utility of consumption and for some 
complementarity between consumption and child's performance. Parents  are characterized 
by two parameters: one, discrete and observable  e  , the education attainment, which takes 
values  e0  e1  e2  . The other, continuous and unobservable,   q   corresponds to the 
"quality"  of the individual. This is related to education, in the sense that for  e  ei   ( i  0,1,2  
), the quality  q   of an individual with  ei     is   q  ei   , where    is a random variable with 
mean  0  . Then, if  ei  ej   : 
 
 
probq ≥ q;ei  1 − Fq − ei   1 − Fq − ej   probq ≥ q;ej       
 
 
 
 where  F.    is the distribution function of    .  
 The parent  owns a time endowment   T     which he/she  can employ in the labour market,  
earning  a wage   wq  ,  or in supervising the child  in studying.    wq    is  a Mincer function  
with   w ′q  0  . If we denote as  h   the time devoted to supervision, the budget  constraint is  
c  wqT − h  
 
 
 
 
School achievement  s    depends on  h   through the following education production function 
(Hanushek (2008)) 
 
s  kh  bq              (2) 
 
 bq   is a continuous increasing function of  q  , while  k   depends on  q   in the following way 
 
kq  kH if q  q0
kL if q ≤ q0
 
 
for some threshold  q0  ,  with  kH  kL    We therefore assume that the ability of a parent in 
assisting  the children changes with the parent's quality level, but in a discrete way and only at 
relatively low levels of education. Then the parent's quality affects children performance both 
directly ( bq  )  and through a higher efficiency in the use of time devoted to children 
assistance. 
 
Now let us consider an individual with a given quality level  q  q0 .  After suitable 
substitutions, the objective  function becomes: 
h,q  wqT − h
1−
1 −   kh  bq
wqT − h
      (3) 
 
 
where  k  kH  . The necessary  condition for an internal  solution is 
 
 
 
hh,q  −wq1−T − h− 
kh  bqwqT − h kkh  bq−1 − T − h−1  0
     (4) 
 
 
Hence: 
 
 
kh  bq  wq
1−−T − h−−
kkh  bq−1 − T − h−1         (5) 
 
 
For sufficiently small changes in  q,   the full impact on the test score  s   is given by: 
ds
dq  kq
dh
dq  bq             (6) 
 
 
The full expression for  
dh
dq  is  
dh
dq
 − hqhh  , where  hh  0;   therefore,  as  q   increases (by 
sufficiently small amounts),  h   changes according to the sign of the following expression 
 
hqh,q   − 1  wq1−T − h− wqwq  
 −1 kkhbq −1−T−h −1kkhbq −1−T−h −1 wq
1−T − h−kh  bq−1bq
     (7) 
 
 
 
 
Equation (keyeq)summarizes the two components of the  impact of   q    on   h  . In the 
absence of  a direct effect  ( bq  0  ),    the sign of  hq    depends on   − 1  .    If there 
is no complementarity  between consumption an school achievement  (   0  ) it is still 
possible that an increase in  e   increases the amount of family support (a rapidly declining 
marginal  utility of consumption is required, i.e.      1.   The sign of the second term is also 
ambiguous. If    1,   it is certainly negative: a higher value of  q   increases the direct 
spillovers, so that the parent can reduce the time devoted to children assistance. By means of 
some tedious calculations, however, it can be shown that the term  
1hh hh −
−1 kkhbq −1−T−h −1
kkhbq −1−T−h −1 wq
1−T − h−kh  bq−1
 
 
 
which represents the overall contribution of the term  bq   to the variation of  s   , is always 
positive. 
Suppose on the other hand  that   q   changes from some initial level  q  q0   to  q  Δq  q0  
, where  Δq   is finite. Then we have the following change in the test score 
 
 
Δs
Δq  kL
h q  Δq − h q
Δq 
b q  Δq − b q
Δq  kH − kL 
h q  Δq
Δq     (8) 
 
 
While the first and the second term in (discrete) are the discrete counterparts of the two terms 
of  (total effect), the term  kH − kL 
h q Δq
Δq  , unambiguously positive, appears only in this 
discrete case. Now, if we compare two parents, A   and  B  with education levels respectively  
e0   and  e2 ,   the probability that  qA  q0   and  qB  q0   is:  Fq0 − e0 1 − Fq0 − e2  , 
while if we compare parents  C   and  B  , where the education level of   C   is  e1 ,   the 
probability that  qC  q0   and  qB  q0   is  Fq0 − e1 1 − Fq0 − e2  . This means that we are 
more likely to observe the effect described by the term  kH − kL 
h q Δq
Δq   when we compare 
a low level of education with higher levels, rather than when comparing levels both relatively 
high. 
Unfortunately, we do not observe  h   nor  q  , but only  e   and  y  , the occupational status of 
the parent. The occupational status ( ybl  =blue collar-low qualified,  ybh  =blue collar-high 
qualified, ywl  =white collar-low qualified,  ywh  =white collar-high qualified,  u   = unemployed) 
is assumed to signal, however imperfectly, both the quality of the parent and the use of time 
he/she makes.More precisely we assume: 
  
probywh ;e,q ≥ q  probe,q ≥
q;ywh probywh 
probe,q ≥ q    probywh ;e 
probe;ywh probywh 
probe  , 
i.e. 
 
 
probe,q ≥ q;ywh 
probe,q ≥ q 
probe;ywh 
probe           (9) 
 
 
This assumption simply means that the probability of an individual getting a high qualified, 
white collar job is higher if he/she has a given level of education  and  he/she is of high 
quality, than in the case he/she simply has that level of education.  Notice that since by 
definition: 
 
 
 
 
probe,q ≥ q;ywh   probe,q ≥
q,ywh 
probywh      and   
probe,ywh ;q ≥ q  probe,q ≥
q,ywh 
probq ≥ q     
we have 
 
probe,q ≥ q;ywh  probywh probq ≥ q  probe,ywh ;q ≥
q
      (10) 
 
 
We  can easily prove the following lemma 
 Lemma Under assumption (assumption) :  probq ≥ q;e,ywh   probq ≥ q;e  
 
 
probq ≥ q;e,ywh   probe,ywh ;q ≥
qprobq ≥ q
probe,ywh   probq ≥
q;e  probe;q ≥
qprobq ≥ q
probe
   that  is:   
 
probe,ywh ;q ≥ q
probe,ywh  
probe;q ≥ q
probe   
 Proof By assumption:  
probe,q ≥ q;ywh 
probe,q ≥ q     
probe;ywh 
probe  . Substituting (10) we get: 
 
probe,ywh ;q ≥ q
probe,q ≥ q
probq ≥ q
probywh  
probe;ywh 
probe  
that is: 
probe,ywh ;q ≥ q  probe,ywh probe probe;q ≥
q
 
or: 
 
probe,ywh;q≥q
probe,ywh     
probe;q ≥ q
probe   
According to our assumption, we should then expect that a high level of education associated 
with a high qualified, white collar job  is also associated to a high quality level of the parent. 
Assuming that being unemployed signals quality, i.e. that the probability of being unemployed 
is larger for low-quality individuals, is certainly too rash; on the contrary, it seems reasonable 
to assume that being unemployed signals that the opportunity cost of parent's time is rather 
low, and therefore it should, ceteris paribus, lead to more assistance to children. 
 
 
Data and method 
The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is an OECD survey for 
educational attainment which tests 15 year-old students in the subjects of mathematics, 
science and reading proficiency. We use the 2006 cross-section, which includes data about 
the 24 OECD countries plus other 33 countries. 
Along with test scores in reading, math and science, information is collected about many 
characteristics in a students' and in a school questionnaire1. 
The students' questionnaire contains information about family background, socio-economic 
status in terms of ownership of durable goods, a specific focus on science2 issues. 
The school's questionnaire contains information about number of students enrolled, number 
of teachers part-time and full-time employed, quality of infrastructure, type of funds which the 
school receives (public or private). 
For a detailed description of PISA dataset, see OECD (2006). 
Looking at data used for this analysis, the Italian sample consists of 21773 students and 799 
schools. 
Italy is one of the worst achievers among industrialised countries in terms of PISA scores. 
OECD 2006 is no exception. In this paragraph, the distributions of test scores for Italy is 
presented. Non-parametric kernel density estimates describe the score distribution of the 
country. 
Figure 1 displays the test score distributions for reading and math tests in the case of Italy 
(ITA). In the next few sections we proceed to econometric analysis. The average reading 
score is 486 points, while for math the average score is 482 points. 
 
                                                 
1A parents' questionnaire is available for some of the countries containing information about parents' perception of students' achievement, but we do not use this data 
 
2It's the reference theme for 2006 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
In order to perform our econometric analysis, we divide the scores into 3 quantiles, defined at 
0.15, 0.50 and 0.85. The assumption behind this choice is that we can discriminate three 
levels of students: low performing, average students and high performing students. 
We then run quantile regressions to catch the effects of a specified set of regressors on the 
performance of students in different parts of the distribution, testing different dependent 
variables: score in math; overall average score3 ; the overall average score relative to school 
of attendance. 
The set of controls does include: age and gender of student; his/her migration status4 ; a 
variable saying if pupils speak a different language from that of the school's country; school's 
type5, school's region6, education of both mother and father7 ; occupational status of both 
mother and father8, a composite index for socio-economic status at family level ; the number 
of books owned at home9, the lack of qualified math teachers; city size10; the presence of 
                                                 
3Aritmetic mean of math, reading and science tests. 
 
4We consider as migrants the students who were born in a different country from that of the school they attend 
 
5Lyceum or technical institute 
 
6The variables says if the school is in the North or in the South of Italy 
 
7Edum and Eduf in the results 
 
8Msecateg and Fsecateg in the results 
 
9The variable is a dummy with different categories, going from 0 to more than 500 books 
 
10village with less than 3000 people; small town (between 3000 and 15000 people); town (15000 up to 100000 people); city 
(100000 up to 1milion people); large city (more than 1 milion people) 
other school of the same type in the neighbourhood; availability of computers at school; a 
variable saying if the students studies at home; a variable saying if the students takes out of 
school lectures. 
Education is treated as a set of dummy variables saying if the parent has low education, a 
high school diploma or a degree. 
The database contains some information about employment status of parents, although not 
as detailed as we perhaps would like. Since we know if working parents are white or blue 
collars, high or low qualified, we assume that individuals who are not classified neither as 
blue-  nor white collars but that are registered in the dataset are not working. 
Finally, we introduce an interaction term containing the educational level variable and the 
indicator of the occupational status. 
 
Estimation Results 
If we look at  variables other than parent related ones, we find  a number of standard result, 
along with some less conventional suggestions. A general feature is that many coefficients 
become smaller in absolute value as we consider higher quantiles. The likely meaning of this 
feature is that adverse factors are  compensated for by increasing student's talent, while 
favorable influences become less and less crucial to the final performance.  Unsurprising 
results are obtained as regards the school's type, the region and the  non-native condition: 
attending a technical school11, living in the southern regions and being a non-native entail 
lower scores.  More precisely, students of lyceums get on average 45 points more than 
student of technical schools. Students in the north of Italy get on average 30 points more than 
students in the south. Being a non native student determines a 20-25 lower scores than that 
of native students. 
Two less conventional results are: 
a) the coefficient for spoken language at home is positive, which means that per se speaking 
a foreign language constitutes an asset (while, as we have seen, being an immigrant is not). 
b) Males perform on average better than females in math  (which is  a commonly found 
result): however, the coefficient is increasing with the quantile considered,  a phenomenon for 
which an explanation is needed. 
As regards parents' education, the coefficients referred  to father's contribution are significant 
and positive on average. The weight of the coefficient is rather small in comparison to that of 
the mother, with the expected sign.  
As regards mothers, three main results are obtained 
1) While holding a high school degree has a  positive and significant  impact on child's 
performance, the coefficient associated to graduated mothers is negative and significant. 
In terms of the model, if we assume that there exists  a threshold  q0   at which the 
mother's  skill in assisting children when studying increases to a highel level ( kL    to   kH  
), we might interpret this result by saying that the threshold is likely to be reached when 
the parent earns a high school degree. This explains the strong observed effect. When the 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
11Italian high school system is basically split into pre-university institutes, like classical and scientific lyceums, and more 
technical and professional schools 
 
 
parent earns a  university degree,  kH    does not increase anymore. 
2) The fact that the mother works has a positive impact on the performance of their child. If 
anything, this outcome signals that allocation of time to children assistance or supervision 
is not the key  factor  for a good child's performance. 
3) When we control for the occupational status of mothers, the interaction between being 
graduated and holding a  high qualified job has a positive impact on the performance of 
pupils, with higher impact for students with a lower score. This is all the more significant if 
we remind that holding a university degree per se has a negative impact of children's 
behaviour.  The effect of being a high qualified white collar mother translates, on average, 
into a 20 points higher score of the student. 
 
We check the robustness of results by trying different dependent variables,  e.g. the math 
score and  the relative score computed with respect to the school average score. We also ran 
regressions clustered for school. These estimates confirm the previously exposed results. 
We also estimated the same models for different countries in PISA dataset: namely, Sweden 
and Portugal. We followed here the work by Ammermueller (2004) and Canova and Vaglio 
(2010). Sweden is a Scandinavian country which we choose according to traditional 
development of welfare state of countries within this area, while Portugal, besides very similar 
to Italy as regards the distribution of the PISA scores,  may also be considered similar to Italy 
with respect of the general structure of the cultural context belonging to the Mediterrenean 
model of welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1996) . 
Portugal  yields a set of results very close to those concerning Italy, which comforts us on the 
robustness of estimates. Swedish data instead produces remarkably different outcomes.  
Since the Swedish socio-economic and cultural context is commonly held to be completely 
different from the "Mediterranean" model common to Italy and Portugal, it is reasonable to 
conjecture that  these social and economic context variables could be of some help in 
explaining the peculiar features of mother's education. 
Results of these regressions are presented in Appendix A. 
Table 1 -Quantile regressions: results for 0.15, 0.50, 0.85 quantiles: overall scores 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES q15 q50 q85 
    
sex 2.341 10.52*** 14.23*** 
 (1.904) (1.346) (2.315) 
lyceum 59.83*** 53.06*** 42.80*** 
 (1.172) (0.792) (0.820) 
employed 89.02* 70.18*** 18.05 
 (48.24) (15.10) (15.37) 
_Ieduf_2 11.03*** 8.567*** 12.37*** 
 (1.712) (1.914) (1.930) 
_Ieduf_3 -8.103*** -3.238 3.967** 
 (2.778) (2.470) (1.727) 
_Iedum_2 8.843*** 13.23*** 9.953*** 
 (1.594) (1.002) (2.447) 
_Iedum_3 -25.01*** -17.99*** -12.48* 
 (6.593) (3.281) (6.950) 
_Imsecateg_1 2.911 5.358** 4.719 
 (5.144) (2.163) (3.476) 
_IeduXmse_2_1 -3.782 -5.562 -2.724 
 (7.201) (3.446) (3.034) 
_IeduXmse_3_1 26.21** 22.90*** 19.20*** 
 (10.63) (5.606) (4.747) 
fsecateg 5.742*** 2.817 1.304 
 (1.404) (1.880) (3.186) 
migrant_student -37.67*** -33.10*** -20.45*** 
 (4.172) (3.897) (5.989) 
_Iforeign_l_1 20.81*** 16.05*** 12.21*** 
 (1.666) (1.978) (1.175) 
escs 5.330*** 3.954** 0.517 
 (0.660) (1.548) (1.677) 
_Inr_books_2 15.45*** 12.98*** 19.92*** 
 (1.845) (3.244) (5.128) 
_Inr_books_3 30.71*** 30.18*** 38.48*** 
 (2.975) (1.858) (3.995) 
_Inr_books_4 41.18*** 42.46*** 51.58*** 
 (4.277) (3.009) (4.231) 
_Inr_books_5 53.08*** 49.30*** 60.40*** 
 (2.393) (2.815) (3.343) 
_Inr_books_6 60.01*** 61.18*** 70.01*** 
 (6.718) (4.173) (1.731) 
no_sch_available -4.639* -6.022** 0.118 
 (2.558) (2.971) (2.645) 
_Icity_size_2 15.92*** 21.02*** 18.13** 
 (5.160) (6.962) (8.401) 
_Icity_size_3 29.80*** 34.42*** 25.38*** 
 (4.677) (6.144) (7.698) 
_Icity_size_4 35.01*** 40.29*** 33.66*** 
 (4.785) (6.330) (5.127) 
_Icity_size_5 27.82*** 36.05*** 21.63*** 
 (9.669) (6.826) (7.209) 
school_north 39.45*** 37.46*** 31.86*** 
 (1.190) (1.783) (1.800) 
study_out -45.58*** -47.23*** -50.61*** 
 (2.988) (1.267) (3.075) 
selfstudy 10.44*** 4.098* -0.593 
 (2.376) (2.094) (1.225) 
    
Observations 15192 15192 15192 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
* denote level of significance: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%  
 
Conclusions 
Why  is  parents' education so important? The general finding of this paper is that parents' 
education influences children achievement through indirect channels rather than through 
relatively time-intensive channels. Motivation, knowledge spillover, provision of a material and 
emotional environment enhancing school performance seem therefore to be the driving factor. 
This is particularly important if we think that these results refer to mother's  education and use 
of time (e.g. women access to the job market), which are two key issues in the discussion 
over women role in the society: our results mean that an educated and high qualified mother  
benefits the school achievement  of her children independently, at least to some  extent, of 
the time she devotes to  direct supervision and help. Were our conclusions confirmed by  
further research, then those institutional arrangements which enhance women education and 
participation to the job market (and to the most qualified segments thereof), would receive 
further support. 
The policy relevance of such a conclusion is important in terms of design of social policies 
aiming at helping mothers through childcare allowances or other public transfer, which, at the 
same time, do not preclude job perspectives of beneficiaries. The relevance of the issue is 
striking for a country like Italy which is traditionally considered an example of the familistic 
welfare state model (Esping Andersen, 1990) and that experiences an overheated debate 
about the possibility of reforming radically education system. 
The main evidence seems to be that quantity of time devoted to education of children is not a 
driving factor in having an impact on the performance of students. Parents who have invested 
in human capital have a strong positive impact on students' scores and the quality of their job 
is relevant.Spill-over effects or personal example provided by parents is probably playing a 
role here and must be take into consideration as an evidence that pupils' educational 
attainment is the multidimensional result of many factors, requiring therefore targeted public 
interventions for each of them. 
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